We analyze a model of cheap talk in which an expert that faces a con ‡ict of interest with a decision maker is concerned about establishing a reputation for having accurate information. In this environment, the incentive of the expert to establish a reputation for competence has a non-monotonic e¤ect on the degree of information revelation. An increase in reputation above a certain threshold always makes truthful revelation more di¢ cult to achieve. This is driven by the fact that experts with greater reputation for
Introduction
There are several economic and political settings in which an expert that is called on to provide information to a decision maker faces an intrinsic con ‡ict of interest. In many such cases, it is plausible to presume that the decision maker is aware of this con ‡ict, at least to some extent. For example, many investors are likely to have a good understanding of the fact that …nancial analysts have incentives to provide biased reports. 1 Similarly, in the political arena, the electoral body is likely to know that government agencies have reasons to bias their macroeconomic forecasts towards those that favor politicians. 2 A standard argument is that the concern of an expert about establishing a reputation for being competent should mitigate this con ‡ict. 3 The central question that we address in this paper is how reputation for ability and more in general the perceived quality of an expert's information a¤ect the communication process 1 See for example Michaeli and Womack (1999) and Barber et al. (2006 Barber et al. ( , 2007 showing that a¢ liated analysts have an optimism bias resulting from their involvement in the investment banking activity of their brokerage house. 2 Weatherford (1987) , Alesina and Roubini (1997) and Carlsen (1999) document that incumbent governments generally prefer agencies that are more inclined to provide optimistic forecasts. In these cases, the con ‡ict of interest originates from the ability of the executive branch to sanction agencies that fail to act in its interest by proposing budget cuts, disposing of executives or even advocating termination of the agency. 3 See for example Mikhail et al. (1999) , Hong and Kubik (2003) and Fang and Yasuda (2009) for the case of …nancial analysts. Heclo (1975) , Rourke (1992) , Carpenter (2001) , Wilson (1989) , Bendor et al. (1985) and Banks and Weingast (1992) document the disciplining role of reputation and career concerns in the political arena.
in a context in which the expert's bias is commonly known. We …nd that in the presence of con ‡icts of interest, decision makers are not necessarily better o¤ when they consult more reputable experts (i.e., experts with a better expected quality of information). Indeed, we show that it may be optimal for a decision maker to consult a less reputable expert precisely when incentives are less aligned.
We derive these conclusions in a model of cheap talk in which an expert privately observes a (binary) signal about a (binary) state of the world, and subsequently makes a cheap talk report to a decision maker. 4 The accuracy of the signal depends on the ability of the expert, which is unknown both to the expert and the decision maker. The decision maker observes the report and updates her belief about the state. Once the state has been publicly revealed, the decision maker uses the report to also update her belief about the ability of the expert.
To capture the presence of con ‡icts of interest and the expert's reputational concern for ability, we assume that the payo¤ of the expert is increasing both in the decision maker's belief that the state is high and in the decision maker's belief about the ability of the expert.
Thus, when deciding which report to make, the expert trades o¤ the reputational reward of providing a correct report against the bene…t of using his credibility to sway the receiver's beliefs about the state in the desired direction. The payo¤ function of the expert is assumed to be common knowledge. This implies that the decision maker is aware of the expert's bias.
A distinctive feature of our model is that an increase in the level of initial reputation has a non-monotonic e¤ect on the expert's incentives to truthfully reveal his information.
In particular, beyond a certain threshold, any increase in initial reputation always increases the expert's incentives to sway the beliefs of the decision maker towards the desired (high)
state. This is in contrast with the case of no con ‡icts of interest, where an increase in the level of initial reputation always has a positive e¤ect on the expert's incentives to truthfully reveal his information. Intuitively, as reputation becomes su¢ ciently high, there is less scope for reputation acquisition and reputation becomes less e¤ective in mitigating the expert's 4 We use male pronouns for the expert and female pronouns for the decision maker.
bias. 5 At the same time, as the reputation of an expert increases, the decision maker assigns more weight to his advice. This in turn provides a biased expert with a higher incentive to misreport.
Thus, when an expert has an explicit con ‡ict of interest, his incentives to misreport increase endogenously with his level of reputation. This has two implications. First, for higher and higher values of initial reputation, truthful revelation occurs for lower and lower beliefs about the state of the world. This is so because when beliefs about the state of the world are strongly pessimistic, a positive message has little e¤ect in inducing decision makers to believe that things are actually going well, thereby attenuating the strong incentives of a highly reputable expert to misreport. Second, ceteris paribus, the distortionary incentives provided by reputation may induce a more reputable expert to lie when a less reputable one does not, implying that in the presence of con ‡icts of interest decision makers are not necessarily better o¤ when they consult more reputable experts. In particular, we show that an increase in con ‡icts of interest tends to exacerbate the perverse incentives of reputation.
Indeed, we …nd that as the bias becomes more severe, hiring experts with greater reputation becomes less and less convenient.
Finally, we show that in the presence of con ‡icts of interest and reputational concerns for ability, truthful revelation becomes possible only when public information is rather contrary to the state towards which the expert wishes to sway the beliefs of the decision maker. For example, in our binary model, an expert with a strong bias towards the high state will report truthfully only when the prior probability of the high state is relatively small. This result, which again arises from the interaction between the expert's con ‡ict of interest and his reputational concerns, suggests that a biased expert should be consulted over issues for which public consensus is polarized around a belief that is opposite to the one that the expert would like to induce.
Our paper is related to two main strands of the literature on sender-receiver models of information transmission. The …rst strand analyzes information transmission in the case in which senders' and receivers' preferences are misaligned (Crawford and Sobel 1982 A standard result of the …rst strand is that only noisy information can be credibly transmitted if the expert and the decision maker have con ‡icting preferences. In particular, the more biased the expert is, the noisier the information revealed (Crawford and Sobel 1982) .
Starting with Sobel (1985) , this literature has analyzed games of cheap-talk in which there is uncertainty on the preferences of the expert, and the expert can establish a reputation for being unbiased (Benabou and Laroque 1992; Morris 2001). In particular, Morris (2001) highlights a potentially distortionary e¤ect of reputation by showing that an advisor with preferences aligned with those of the decision maker may in fact distort his private information in order to build a reputation for being unbiased. 6 In our model, the preferences of the expert are assumed to be common knowledge and uncertainty is about the forecasting ability of the expert. The issue we address is whether experts with a higher reputation for competence are more likely to credibly transmit their information when it is well known that they are biased.
Our paper is closely related to Sorensen (2001, 2006) . They study information reporting by privately informed experts who are solely motivated by the desire to be perceived as competent, and show that honesty is impossible under very general conditions.
In their model, the amount of information that is credibly transmitted is always increasing in the quality of the expert's information. By introducing con ‡icts of interest in a setting with reputation for ability, we show that greater quality of information is not necessarily associated with less misreporting. In some respect, our work is complementary to Bourjade and Jullien (2011) who also consider the case of a biased expert with a reputational concern for competence, but in a setting in which the expert has hard information. They consider strategic concealment of private information while we analyze the issue of misrepresentation of information.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the general setup of the model. Section 3 characterizes the most informative equilibrium and analyzes the conditions under which truthtelling is possible, highlighting the incentives that lead experts to deviate from truthtelling. Section 4 examines the relationship between the reputation of an expert and his credibility, and Section 5 studies how changes in the intensity of con ‡icts of interest a¤ect this relationship. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
An expert is called upon to provide information to a decision maker (DM) who has to make a forecast about the state of world. The state of the world ! is either low or high, i.e., ! 2 f0; 1g, and all players hold the same prior belief that the state is 1. At the beginning of the game, the expert observes a private and non-veri…able signal s 2 fs 0 ; s 1 g about the true state, and its accuracy depends on the expert's ability t. We assume that the expert is either good or bad, i.e., t 2 fg; bg, and that ability a¤ects the accuracy of the signal as follows:
Therefore, both expert types can count on an informative (yet imperfect) signal, with the good type having a more accurate signal than a bad type. 7 We assume that neither the expert nor the decision maker know the expert's type, and all players hold the same prior belief that the expert is good. We interpret as the prior reputation for ability of the expert.
After observing the signal, the expert chooses to release a report to the decision maker in the form of a costless binary message m 2 fm 0 ; m 1 g. The decision maker observes message m and chooses an action x 2 R. Finally, the true state of the world is revealed and together with the message of the expert is used by the decision maker to revise her beliefs about the expert's ability. 8 We denote with b !;m Pr(t = gj!; m), the decision maker's posterior belief that the expert is good upon observing state ! and message m. We interpret b !;m as the new level of reputation for ability acquired by the expert at the end of the game.
The decision maker's utility depends on the state of the world ! and her action x. As is standard in the literature, we assume that the decision maker's utility is given by the quadratic loss function (x !) 2 . This implies that the action that maximizes the expected utility of the decision maker is equal to the probability she assigns to the state of the world being 1. Given that message m was sent by the expert with prior reputation , we denote with b ;m Pr(! = 1jm) the decision maker's interim belief (i.e., prior to the realization of the state of the world) that the state of the world is 1. Thus, in equilibrium the decision maker' optimal action is x = b ;m . As we will see, in any equilibrium in which some information is transmitted, the higher the reputation of the expert, the more the decision maker will trust the message sent. The subscript highlights this relationship.
To model the expert's concern about establishing a reputation for being a valuable provider of information and the contemporaneous existence of con ‡icts of interest, we con-struct a game where the payo¤ of the expert depends positively on the decision maker's action x as well as on the posterior belief b !;m , as follows:
Since in equilibrium x = b ;m ;the expert's payo¤ can be rewritten as:
The component b !;m captures the concern of the expert to be perceived as having accurate information. 9 The component b ;m gives the expert an incentive to in ‡ate the decision maker's belief that the state is 1, and thus creates a con ‡ict of interest with the decision maker. 10 Finally, the parameter k 2 [0; 1] weighs these two components and can be seen as a measure of the severity of con ‡icts of interest. The structure and the parameters of the game (with the sole exception of the expert's signal) are common knowledge.
Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we analyze the incentives of an expert to truthfully report his information and characterize the most informative equilibrium. 13 At the moment of sending message m, the true state of the world is unknown to the expert. The expert uses his signal s to compute the expected impact of message m on his reputation, as follows:
Therefore, the expected payo¤ of the expert from sending message m reads:
Before analyzing the incentives of an expert to truthfully report his information, it is convenient to gain an intuition of the tensions involved in the reporting decision. In any equilibrium where some information is transmitted we have that b ;m 1 > b ;m 0 . 14 This introduces an incentive to report message m 1 and represents a threat to truthtelling whenever signal s 0 is received. In fact, the presence of reputational concerns counterbalances this over-optimism bias. As long as k 2 (0; 1), the expert has to trade o¤ the temptation of sending m 1 with the negative e¤ects that this message might have on his reputation in case the message turns out to be incorrect.
The equilibrium concept we use is that of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). The expert will truthfully report signal s if and only if the expected payo¤ of truthtelling is greater than the payo¤ of reporting a message that is di¤erent from the signal received.
Thus, a truthtelling equilibrium exists if and only if for every s 2 fs 0 ; s 1 g, E ( (m = s)js) E ( (m 6 = s)js), or equivalently:
In a truthtelling equilibrium, posterior reputation takes on only two possible values, which
we denote with and , where:
with > > . 15 Making a correct evaluation increases the expert's reputation from its initial level to the higher level . Making a wrong evaluation decreases the expert's reputation from to the lower level . In the rest of the paper we denote ( ) as the reputational reward of being recognized as a good expert. This allows us to write conditions (6) and (7) in the following way:
For each of the above conditions, we refer to the left hand side as the bene…t of providing a high message, and to the right hand side as the expected reputational gain of sending a low message. Notice that the right hand side of (10) represents the expected reputational gain of truthtelling when receiving a low signal, while the right hand side of (11) represents the expected reputational gain of misreporting when receiving a high signal. 15 We show this result in the Appendix.
It is straightforward to show that when reputation does not play any role (i.e., when (10) is never satis…ed and a truthtelling equilibrium never exists. We now establish that whenever the expert is concerned about reputation some information can be transmitted.
Lemma 1 Independently of whether the expert faces a con ‡ict of interest (i.e., for any k 2 [0; 1)), there always exists a non empty interval ; ; with 0 < < < 1 such that the most informative equilibrium is: (i) separating (i.e. fully revealing) for 2 ; and (ii)
(Proof: see Appendix)
When is relatively extreme, the expert believes that any contrarian signal he receives is likely to be incorrect. Being afraid that ex-post incorrect messages may negatively a¤ect his reputation, he disregards his private information and reports the signal that is more likely to be correct ex-post. This is the conservative behavior highlighted by Ottaviani and Sorensen There is a simple reason why this behavior persists in our context with con ‡icts of interest.
When is very low (high), the decision maker expects the state to be 0 (1) regardless of the message sent. As a result, the net gain from in ‡ating the beliefs of the the decision maker by sending m 1 instead of a m 0 is very small (i.e., the LHSs of conditions (10) and (11) are close to zero) and the choice of the expert is mainly driven by reputational concerns.
The previous …nding highlights that when public opinion is polarized, con ‡icts of interest are less relevant. No matter how strong is the con ‡ict (i.e., how large is k), the bias-driven incentives to misreport are small since the expert's ability to sway the decision maker's beliefs in a desired direction is limited. As we show in sections 4 and 5, the presence of con ‡icts of interest is not innocuous with respect to other relevant dimensions of the problem that we are analyzing.
The E¤ects of Reputation on Credibility
In this section, we address the following question. Assuming that the decision maker could choose among a pool of experts with di¤erent levels of reputation, would she always choose the expert with the highest reputation? As it will soon become clear, in order to answer this question it is su¢ cient to study how the truthtelling region ; is a¤ected by a change in prior reputation . It is useful to begin our analysis by considering the benchmark case in which there are no con ‡icts of interest (i.e., k = 0).
Remark 1
In the absence of con ‡icts of interest, the truthtelling region ; is symmetri-
and, ceteris paribus, expands monotonically as increases.
This result implies that a decision maker can never be worse o¤ by consulting an expert with a higher reputation. If an expert with a certain level of reputation truthfully reveals his information, then any expert with a higher level of reputation will also report truthfully and will do so with a higher expected precision of his signal.
The situation is quite di¤erent in the presence of con ‡icts of interest (i.e., k 2 (0; 1)) since a variation in prior reputation has a non-monotonic e¤ect on the credibility region. To gain the intuition behind proposition 1, consider the truthtelling conditions (10) and (11) . First, note that the net bene…t of sending a high report, b ;m 1 b ;m 0 is increasing in the level of prior reputation . This is so because an expert with a higher level of reputation is expected to have more accurate signals. As a consequence, in any informative equilibrium, the messages of this expert will have a greater impact on the decision maker's beliefs about the state. Then, note that the net reputational reward of being recognized as a good expert, is strictly concave in , and progressively shrinks to zero as approaches either zero or one. This occurs because the scope for reputation acquisition is greater, the higher the uncertainty about the expert's ability and becomes negligible when the uncertainty about ability is very low. 16 The interaction between these two e¤ects determines the way in which a variation in a¤ects the truthtelling region. As increases above a certain threshold, the net reputational reward of being recognized as a good expert (i.e., ) starts to shrink, while the net bene…t of sending a high message (i.e., b ;m 1 b ;m 0 ) keeps growing larger.
Eventually, the incentives of the expert to sway the beliefs of the decision maker in favor of the high state grow larger. In order to counter these incentives and preserve truthtelling, must decrease. Indeed, as the probability that the state is high gets smaller, the expected reputational reward of sending a low message gets larger.
This e¤ect intensi…es as approaches one, in which case the two thresholds and approach zero and the truthtelling region progressively shrinks becoming an empty set. A similar reasoning suggests that an increase in has a positive e¤ect on the size of the truthtelling region whenever the initial level of reputation is below a certain threshold.
An important consequence of introducing con ‡icts of interest in a setting in which experts are concerned about their reputation for ability is that consulting experts of higher reputation is not necessarily an optimal choice for decision makers. Combining Lemma 1
and Proposition 1, we obtain the following proposition: (Proof: see Appendix)
Unlike in the absence of con ‡icts of interest, the distortionary incentives provided by reputation may induce a more reputable expert to lie when a less reputable expert would not. This suggests that in the presence of con ‡icts of interest, decision makers are not necessarily better o¤ consulting more reputable experts. To see this point, consider the following example. Assume there are two experts with reputation 0 and 1 respectively, where 0 < 00 < 1 . Suppose that the prior on the state of the world is = ( 00 ).
The expert with high reputation has a truthtelling threshold ( 1 ) < ( 00 ) and will not provide any information while the expert with low reputation has a truthtelling threshold ( 0 ) > ( 00 ) and will provide valuable information. Thus, if the prior on the state of the world is = ( 00 ) and the DM could choose which expert to hire, she would choose the expert with lower reputation.
Variations in Con ‡icts of Interest
We conclude our analysis by considering how the magnitude of con ‡icts of interest represented by k, may a¤ect the results presented in the previous section.
In order to examine the relationship between con ‡icts of interest and the nature of the truthtelling region, we analyze how variations in k a¤ect the truthtelling thresholds and .
The following proposition highlights that when the prior on the state of the world is rather pessimistic, experts with a greater con ‡ict of interest may be more likely to tell the truth than experts with a lower bias.
Proposition 3 As con ‡icts of interest increase, the truthtelling region shifts downwards (i.e. both and are decreasing in k)
We know from remark 1 that in the absence of a bias (i.e., k = 0), the truthtelling region is centered around = of at which the expert is indi¤erent between the high and the low message. Again, as k increases and the expert's optimistic bias becomes stronger, the indi¤erence at k 0 will be broken in favor of the high message.
In general, the previous analysis suggests that when an expert is biased, truthful revelation occurs when public information is rather contrary to the state towards which the expert wishes to sway public opinion. Therefore, in situations in which public information is polarized around a certain belief, consulting an expert with a contrary bias may be more valuable than consulting an unbiased expert.
As we have seen in section 4, in the presence of con ‡icts of interest, the distortionary incentives provided by reputation may induce a more reputable expert to lie when a less reputable expert would not. We now establish that an increase in con ‡icts of interest tends to exacerbate the perverse incentives of reputation. Indeed, as the bias becomes more severe (i.e., as k increases), hiring experts with greater reputation becomes less and less convenient.
This result is highlighted in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 For any prior on the state of the world such that an expert truthfully reveals his information, an increase in k strictly reduces 0 .
Decision makers may therefore be better o¤ consulting less reputable experts precisely when incentives are less aligned. Moreover, reputation becomes less e¤ective in mitigating con ‡icts of interest exactly when it is more needed.
Conclusions
Con ‡icts of interest are relevant in many economic settings in which an expert with privileged information is called upon to provide information to an uninformed decision maker. In this paper, we focused on the trade-o¤ that biased experts typically face between the short-term bene…ts of providing a biased report and the long-term rewards of establishing a reputation for having accurate information.
We …nd that the interaction between reputation and con ‡icts of interest plays an important role in shaping the incentives of experts. Reputation for ability allows for some information transmission even when decision makers know that an expert is biased. However, reputation has a non-monotonic e¤ect on information transmission. In particular, when the expert's reputation rises above a critical threshold, the expert is more likely to misreport. Therefore decision makers may be better o¤ choosing experts of lower reputation. This occurs because a report sent by an expert with an established reputation for ability, has a greater impact on the beliefs of the decision maker. Accordingly, a highly reputable expert has greater incentives to cash in on reputation by swaying the beliefs of decision makers in the desired direction. Moreover, when con ‡icts of interest are more intense, reputation is less e¤ective in inducing experts to reveal their information. Therefore, decision makers should consult experts with a lower reputation for ability when their preferences are less aligned.
A suggested avenue for future research is to gather further insight on the role of both ability and preferences in jointly determining the reputation of experts. In particular, a relevant question involves understanding in which circumstances decision makers may be better o¤ consulting experts that have similar preferences, rather than those that have more accurate information. Capturing how these elements may a¤ect the credibility of an expert through the reputational channel represents an open issue.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. We divide the proof of Lemma 1 into the following three Parts:
A Truthtelling exists for ; :
B No informative equilibria exist outside ; :
C Babbling equilibria always exist. 
where q p + (1 )z.
These results allow us to rewrite truthtelling conditions (10) and (11) as follows:
Consider condition (A1). Since 1 2 z < q < p < 1 and 2 (0; 1), we have that + q 2q > 0. Thus, (A1) is equivalent to:
and r( )
. Note that for every We now show that > . Note that:
The LHSs of (A1) and (A2) have the same expression. This expression is equal to zero at = 0; 1. It is strictly positive and strictly concave in for 2 (0; 1).
Property(e):
The expression of the RHS of (A1) is strictly larger than the expression of the RHS of (A2). Both expressions are strictly decreasing in .
Together with the uniqueness of and , properties (d) and (e) imply that > .
We conclude step A by establishing a property that we will use later, namely:
To see that Property (f) holds, note that is the value of at which (A1) holds with equality. Now note that RHS of (A1) is strictly negative for values of strictly larger than q. This result, together with properties (d) and (e) above, imply that equality can occur only at a value of smaller than or equal to q.
Part B -No informative equilibria exist outside ;
An informative equilibria exists as long as it satis…es the following two conditions:
For simplicity, let us rewrite these conditions using the following short-hand notation:
Aside truthtelling, the following (mixed-strategy) informative equilibria are to be considered:
The expert truthfully reports m 1 after signal s 1 (RHS(s 1 ) < LHS), while he reports m 0 with probability u 0;0 and m 1 with probability 1 u 0;0 after signal s 0 (RHS(s 0 ) =
LHS)
PP0: The expert truthfully reports m 0 after signal s 0 (RHS(s 0 ) > LHS), while he reports m 1 with probability u 1;1 and m 0 with probability 1 u 1;1 after signal s 1 (LHS = RHS(s 1 )).
PP:
The expert follows a mixed strategy both after s 0 and s 1 . He reports m 1 with probability u 1;1 and m 0 with probability 1 u 1;1 after signal s 1 (RHS(s 0 ) = LHS); and he reports m 0 with probability u 0;0 and m 1 with probability 1 u 0;0 after signal s 0 (RHS(s 1 ) = LHS); where u 0;0 6 = u 1;1 .
Note that since signals are informative, Pr(! = 1 j s 1 ) > Pr(! = 1 j s 0 ) and Pr(! = 0 j s 0 ) > Pr(! = 0 j s 1 ); Furthermore, whenever messages contain some information, b !=m b !6 =m . Given this, it it follows that RHS(s 0 ) > RHS(s 1 ) for any so that:
We show that none of the three equilibria above exists for > (a similar reasoning applies for < ).
We …rst show that PP1 does not exist. Suppose that the expert receives s 0 . The expert will follow the equilibrium strategy of sending m 0 with probability u 0;0 and m 1 with probability 1 u 0;0 if and only if condition (A4) holds with equality, that is: 
This equality can equivalently be written as:
We have to show that there does not exist any u 0;0 2 (0; 1) such that (A10) is satis…ed when 2 ; 1 . Since we know from Property (f) in Step A that q, it is convenient to consider the following two cases:
2 (q; 1). Note that when 2 (q; 1), the LHS of (A10) is positive, while the RHS is strictly negative because 1 2 + u u(1 q) < 0. Thus, (A10) can never be satis…ed for 2 (q; 1).
2 ; q . Note that the LHS and RHS of (A10) satisfy the following properties respectively:
In words, the RHS is strictly increasing and strictly convex in u 0;0 for 2 (0; 1), while the LHS is strictly decreasing and strictly concave in u 0;0 for 2 (0; q]. Properties (A11) to (A14) imply that when 2 (0; q], if a u 0;0 exists such that condition (A10)
is satis…ed, it must be unique. Now, we know that at u 0;0 = 1 (i.e. when there is truthtelling) the following two facts hold true: a) Condition (A10) is satis…ed for = ; b) The LHS of condition (A10) is strictly greater than the RHS for 2 ; q .
But then, by properties (A11) to (A14) we have that for all 2 ; q , there does not exist any u 0;0 2 (0; 1) such that (A10) can be satis…ed.
We now show that PP0 does not exist. We have just shown that for every > , PP1 does not exist.. In particular, RHS(s 0 ) LHS < 0 By (A8), this also implies that RHS(s 1 ) LHS < 0. Therefore if PP1 never exists also PP0 never exists (because PP0
requires that RHS(s 1 ) LHS = 0).
We …nally show that PP does not exist. PP requires both (A6) and (A7) to be satis…ed with equality, which in turn implies that RHS(s 0 ) = RHS(s 1 ). This violates condition (A8).
Part C -Babbling Equilibria always exist
We conclude the proof of lemma 1 by showing that a babbling equilibrium where the expert sends m 1 with probability and m 0 with probability 1 irrespectively of the signal observed always exists. In this case all messages are taken to be meaningless and ignored: b ;m = for any m 2 fm 0 ; m 1 g, and b !;m = for any ! 2 f0; 1g and m 2 fm 0 ; m 1 g, making the expert indi¤erent between the two messages.
Proof of Remark 1. When k = 0, condition (A1) boils down to 0 (p q)( q).
Thus, when k = 0, the upper bound of the truthtelling region is k=0 = q p + (1 )z.
Similarly, from condition (A2), one can show that when k = 0 the lower bound of the truthtelling region is k=0 = 1 q 1 ( p + (1 )z).
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider condition (A1) and notice that for every k 2
; p) and p 2 (z; 1), the following holds true:
and
and RHS 1 ! 0; thus, for ! 1 : ! 0. Now, (i) and (ii) imply that for ! 0, ! 0; A similar argument applies to condition (A2) to show that: (iii) For ! 0, ! 0; (iv) For ! 1, ! 0. Now, (iii) and (iv) imply that for ! 1, ! 0.
Since is positive for any value of 2 (0; 1), by continuity there exists a value of = 2 (0; 1) below which is increasing in , and a value of = 2 (0; 1) above which is decreasing in . Note that properties (i) to (iv) above imply that > .
Proof of Proposition 2. Let (k; ; z; p) be the solution to condition (A1). Note that Lemma 1 guarantees that (k; ; z; p) is de…ned for every 2 (0; 1), k 2 [0; 1), z 2 ( ; p), p 2 (z; 1).
Since we are interested in changes in while keeping all other parameters constant, for the sake of notation, we simply write ( ).
By Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, we know that ( ) satis…es the following properties for k 2 (0; 1) and 2 ( ; 1):
(a) ( ) is continuous and strictly decreasing in ;
(b) ( ) < 1 and (1) ! 0.
For a given 2 (0; 1) ; we de…ne 0 ( ) as the value of such that for every 2 ( 0 ( ) ; 1] it holds that > ( ) In order to prove the proposition we need to show that 0 ( ) 2 (0; 1) for every 2 (0; 1).
We therefore consider the following two cases:
1. 2 0; ( ) -Properties (a) and (b) imply that for any given 2 0; ( ) we have that 0 ( ) 2 ( ; 1) :
2. 2 ( ( ); 1) -Property (a) implies that for every 2 ( ; 1) we have that > ( ).
This implies that 0 ( ) .
Proof of Proposition 3. To proof proposition 3, …rst note that:
In condition (A1), @RHS @ < 0. Since < q, (see Property (f) in the Proof of Lemma 1), the previous result together with (A15) and (A16) implies that is decreasing in k. The same reasoning applies to condition (A2) to show that is decreasing in k.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let us denote with (k; ) the solution to condition (A1).
Note that Lemma 1 guarantees that (k; ) is de…ned for every 2 (0; 1), k 2 [0; 1) :
By the proof of proposition 1, we know that:
(a) For every k 2 (0; 1), there always exists an (k) such that (k; ) is strictly decreasing for all 2 ( (k); 1).
By proposition 3, we know that the following property holds true:
(b) For any k 0 ; k 1 2 (0; 1) such that k 1 > k 0 and every 2 (0; 1) ; (k 1 ; ) < (k 0 ; ).
Now, let:
(k 0 ) be the value of when k = k 0 ;
(k 0 ; (k 0 ) be the value of ( ; k) when k = k 0 and = (k 0 ); 0 (k 0 ; ) and 0 (k 1 ; ) respectively denote the values of 0 ( ) when k = k 0 and k = k 1 , where 0 ( ) is de…ned in proposition 2.
Then, by properties (a) and (b), for every 2 (0; (k 0 ; (k 0 )) it must be that 0 (k 1 ; ) < 0 (k 0 ; ). 
